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Abstract 
The Elaborated Intrusion model (Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2005) argues that a craving 
episode begins with a desire-related intrusive thought. This study tests the assumption that 
such intrusive thoughts, during hunger, reflect an increase in accessibility of food-related 
information in memory. Fify-six undergraduates were randomly assigned to hungry or 
satiated conditions. Hunger was manipulated by asking the ‘hungry’ group to abstain from 
eating breakfast and snacks prior to testing before lunch, while the ‘satiated’ group was asked 
to eat normally and attend testing after lunch. Participants completed a lexical decision task 
containing food-related and neutral words, an intrusive thoughts questionnaire and a hunger 
questionnaire. Priming for food-related items relative to neutral on the lexical decision task 
was higher for hungry participants than satiated participants. Priming correlated strongly with 
frequency of food-related intrusive thoughts during the task. We conclude that desire-related 
lexical decision priming could provide a useful objective correlate of proneness to desire-
related intrusions.
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Introduction 
Intrusive thoughts are subjectively felt to occur spontaneously, without effort or origin and 
are an ordinary experience for the majority of the population, concerning work or food, for 
example. However, intrusive thoughts are characteristic of several clinical disorders, for 
example Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder and Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (Purdon, 1999; Langlois, Freeston, Ladouceur, 2000a,b; Green, 2003; 
Watkins, 2004). They also take the form of intrusive memories in post-traumatic stress 
disorder and depression (Reynolds and Brewin, 1999) and can be experienced by non-clinical 
populations (Brewin, Christodoulides and Hutchison, 1996; Langlois, Freeston and 
Ladouceur, 2000a, 2000b; Bywaters, Andrade and Turpin, 2004). Recently, the Elaborated 
Intrusion theory (EI theory) has given them a key role in addiction and motivated behaviour 
more generally  (Kavanagh, Andrade & May, 2005). 
The EI theory of desire views intrusive thoughts as the gateway to episodes of craving. 
Eliciting factors, such as environmental or internal target-related cues, increase the 
accessibility of target-related information by activating semantic or episodic memory 
representations; this increases the probability of a target-related intrusive thought. If the 
thought is salient or concurrent cognitive activity has low priority then the intrusive thought 
can trigger elaborative processes. This elaboration involves a controlled cognitive search for 
target-related information and retention of this information in working memory, resulting in 
highly elaborated cognitions concerning the target, usually in the form of mental imagery: 
people imagine the target and its consumption, for example, unwrapping and tasting a 
chocolate bar, or taking a drag on a cigarette. This imagery simulates the actual experience 
and so is momentarily pleasurable, but in the longer-term it exacerbates awareness of deficit 
and lowers mood, causing the aversive sensation of craving when the desire is unfulfilled. 
These processes serve to maintain the goal of target acquisition. 
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There is evidence to support intrusive thoughts and elaboration in craving for a range of 
substances. A questionnaire study by May, Andrade, Panabokke and Kavanagh (2004) found 
that participants rated “I suddenly thought about it” joint top with “I felt 
hungry/thirsty/tired/physical discomfort” from a list of potential triggers of craving. The role 
of elaboration has been supported by experimental disruption of the working memory 
processes that support mental imagery (Kemps, Tiggemann, Woods and Soekov, 2004; 
Panabokke, 2004). The role of intrusive thoughts in craving is consistent with the finding that 
thought suppression, a technique known to increase intrusions (Wegner, Schneider, Carter 
and White, 1987; Lavy & van den Hout, 1990; Clark, Ball & Pape, 1991) exacerbates craving 
for cigarettes (Salkovskis & Reynolds, 1994; Toll, Sobell, Wagner and Sobell, 2001). 
Thus the EI theory argues that triggers of craving increase the accessibility of craving-related 
information, which in turn increases the probability of a craving-related intrusion. This 
increased accessibility is distinguished from desire itself, along with other associated 
cognitions, physiological deficits, or environmental cues, as an antecedent to desire. The 
occurrence of these events may increase the probability of desire, but they do not represent 
the phenomenon itself. Therefore a state of increased accessibility of craving-related 
information represents a state in which craving might occur. 
Evidence of increased accessibility in craving situations comes from a study by Jarvik, Gross, 
Rosenblatt and Stein (1995), who found that overnight abstinence from smoking, by a group 
of heavy smokers, enhanced lexical processing of smoking-related words. An unpublished 
study by Phillips, Kavanagh, May and Andrade (2004) further supports this; when asked to 
generate words about relaxation, deprived or quit smokers gave more smoking-related words 
than either non-smokers or non-deprived smokers. 
The EI theory also argues that motivational behaviours, such as hunger and thirst, are not 
merely physiological states but have analogous cognitive processes to desire, despite not 
being craving for a particular substance (i.e. a particular food or drink). Whilst hunger and 
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thirst are not examples of craving per se, they are states within which a craving episode can 
occur, i.e. the physiological deficit can act as an antecedent to desire and we can expect an 
increase in accessibility of hunger-related or thirst-related information in memory. It is 
possible to measure these pre-cursors to craving. 
A recent study by Aarts, Dijksterhuis & De Vries (2001) is consistent with these claims from 
the EI theory. They demonstrated that accessibility of drink-related items increases with 
thirst, using a lexical decision task as a measure of cognitive availability: faster response 
latencies to specific items indicate enhanced availability (e.g., Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971). 
Participants were randomly assigned to consume three salty sweets (thirsty condition), to 
draw three figures, or to consume three non-salty sweets (non-thirst conditions). They 
completed a lexical decision task consisting of nonsense words, neutral words and drinking-
related words. Thirsty participants responded faster to drinking-related items than neutral 
items, and subsequently recalled more drink-related items compared to no-thirst participants. 
The present study aims to link these two areas of investigation by looking at the relationship 
between the frequency of intrusive thoughts about a desired target and the increased 
availability of desire-related material. Rather than testing a state of craving as such, this study 
aims to explore the pre-cursors of craving in a state in which craving might occur. It does so 
by replicating Aarts et al.’s (2001) task with food-related words, with a manipulation of 
hunger brought about by asking participants to refrain from eating breakfast and morning 
snacks or to eat as normal, including lunch, prior to testing. To minimise memory and other 
biases, participants reported the number of intrusions experienced over a very brief period, 
namely the duration of the lexical decision task. 
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Method 
Materials  
For the lexical decision task, word lists are required which contain an equal number of words 
and non-words. In this study non-words were created using a method taken from Lacruz and 
Folk (2004). This involved splitting existing words to form list of heads and bodies, for 
example, ‘brake’ was broken into ‘br’ and ‘ake’; these were then exchanged quasi-randomly 
to create non-words (for example, the head of brake and the body of meal were put together to 
form ‘breal’). To avoid words and their component fragments appearing in the same list, we 
devised two parallel sets of lists where the words from set A were paired with the non-words 
from set B and vice versa. We devised explicit practice lists of 3 neutral and 3 non-words, 
(mean length 7.33 letters), buffered trials lists of 5 neutral and 5 non-words (mean length 6 
letters), and two experimental lists of 8 food, 16 neutral and 24 non-words (see Appendix; 
mean length list A = 5.42 letters, list B = 5.58 letters). The 40 neutral words used in the two 
sets of lists (including practice, buffered and experimental lists) were taken from Mogg, 
Bradley, Hyare and Lee (1998), and were all transport related nouns. A pilot experiment 
guided the selection of food-related words. Eight hungry participants were asked to write 
down the first twenty words that they could think of. A set of 16 food words was then 
constructed based on the most frequently occurring words and word types, with a mixture of 
eating-related words (e.g., hungry, lunch, stomach) and food words (e.g., food, meal, cheese, 
chocolate). Food words anticipated to be unacceptable to some people (e.g., meat words) were 
avoided. These were arbitrarily divided between word-lists A and B so as to maintain equality 
of mean word length within the lists. The neutral and food words did not differ significantly 
in frequency of occurrence in the 100 million word British National Corpus (2001). 
The Lexical Decision task was presented on a 233MHz iMac G3 with 256Mb RAM, running 
MacOS 8.6, using Psyscope software (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt and Provost, 1993) to run 
the experiment. Each item (words and non-words) was presented in the centre of the computer 
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screen in Chicago font, 35-point font size. Responses were collected with a Carnegie-Mellon 
Button Box to ensure millisecond-accurate timing of stimulus presentation and response 
execution. 
Procedure 
A total of 56 undergraduate students at the University of Sheffield participated in the 
experiment, receiving a participation sticker in return (students who obtain 20 stickers are 
allowed to use the scheme for their own research projects). The manipulation of hunger was 
achieved by manipulating the time of day at which participants were tested. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two hunger conditions, before lunch (hungry) and after lunch 
(satiated). Those who were asked to take part before lunch were also asked to abstain from 
eating any food on the morning of the experiment and were tested before lunchtime (between 
11:00 hours and 13:00 hours); they were told that they were allowed to drink and if they 
should need to eat then to do so but to inform the experimenter. Those that were asked to take 
part after lunch were asked to eat lunch before coming in to take part in the experiment 
(between 13:00 hours and 14:00 hours).  Half of those in each hunger condition were 
randomly assigned to receive Word List A, the other half received Word List B. 
Participants were tested individually. Upon entering the lab, participants were told that the 
experiment involved a computer task and then completion of three questionnaires, for which 
they expressed their consent. They were shown to a seat approximately 40 cm in front of a 
computer screen, in a private cubicle, then presented with the instructions for the lexical 
decision task on the computer screen. 
They then attempted the practice block of six trials. Each item remained on the screen until 
the participant pressed one of the Button Box response keys (green for words or red for non-
words), to indicate whether it was a word or non-word; the next trial followed immediately. 
After the practice block, participants were allowed to ask any questions, and then began the 
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experiment proper. The first 10 trials served as buffer items and were followed immediately 
by the 48 experimental trials. 
The experimental trials were presented in a different random order for each participant. 
Response latencies for each word were measured from when the item appeared on the screen 
until one of the response keys was pressed. 
After the lexical decision task, participants completed three questionnaires. First, participants 
indicated how many intrusive thoughts, related to food, they had experienced during 
completion of the previous task. They then completed a scale (Grand, 1968) in which they 
were asked to circle a number “to indicate how hungry you feel now”, 0 being “not at all 
hungry”, and 6 being “extremely hungry”. They also completed the Eating Attitudes Test 
(EAT-26 factor 1; a standardized 13-item self-report measure of symptoms and concerns 
characteristic of eating disorders, each of which participants rate on an always-never scale; 
Garner, Olmsted, Bohr and Garfinkel, 1982), before being fully debriefed as to the aims of the 
study and given their participation sticker. 
Results 
EAT scores were used for screening: participants with scores above 10 were excluded from 
further analyses. This cut off was taken from Garner et al. (1982) who theorised that scores 
above 10 indicate the presence of disturbed eating patterns, which could itself lead to 
increased accessibility of food concepts. Six people were excluded on this basis: two from the 
hungry and four from the satiated condition. Participants in the hungry condition who rated 
their hunger level as three or less on the hunger scale were excluded in further analyses 
(n = 3). Participants in the satiated condition who rated their hunger level as two or above 
were also excluded from further analyses (n = 3).  
Incorrect (‘no’) responses to existing words (food and neutral) were excluded from further 
analyses (5.14% out of all responses). The mean response latency across the food-related 
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words and neutral words served as the dependent variables. One participant, from the satiated 
condition, was excluded from further analyses because their baseline reaction time created an 
outlier (2317 msec); being more than seven standard deviations above the mean (M = 919 
msec; SD = 176 msec). 
Forty-three participants were included in the analyses in total, nineteen in the hungry 
condition and twenty-four in the satiated condition. The mean hunger levels of these 
participants were 4.74  (SE = 0.17) in the hungry condition and 0.65 (SE = 0.01) in the 
satiated condition. 
Lexical Decision Task 
 [Insert table 1 about here] 
A one-between (hungry vs. satiated) x one-within (neutral vs. food words) ANOVA 
confirmed a significant interaction between hunger condition and word type, F (1, 40) = 9.78, 
p = 0.003, η2 = 0.032 (with η2 computed by SSeffect/SStotal). The main effect of hunger 
condition was not significant (F<1). The main effect of word type was significant, F 
(1,40) = 52.89. p<0.001, η2 = 0.173. The means suggest that hunger slowed lexical decisions 
for neutral words, but not for food-related words, and that response times to food words were 
faster than neutral words in both groups (Table 1). 
Separate between-participant analyses for food-related and neutral words confirmed a 
marginally significant effect of hunger on decision speed for neutral words, F (1, 40) = 4.04, 
p = 0.051, η2 = 0.092, but not for food words (F<1). 
A priming score was calculated by subtracting the food-related decision times from the 
neutral decision times. The hungry group had higher priming scores (M = 171.99, SE =  
22.88) than the satiated group (M = 68.56, SE = 112.05), t(40) = 3.13, p = 0.003. Priming was 
positively correlated with hunger, as measured on the hunger scale (Pearson’s r = 0.42, 
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p = .006): the hungrier a participant, the greater the difference in lexical decision speed to 
neutral and food words. 
Those hungry participants excluded due to high EAT scores showed a similar pattern of 
results to the main group, however the satiated group were slightly slower for food words 
than neutral. The sample was too small for statistical analysis. 
Intrusive Thoughts 
Intrusive thoughts related to food were significantly more frequent in the hungry condition 
(M = 4.68, SE = 0.7, range 0 to 10) than in the satiated condition (M = 2.22, SE = 0.29, range 
0 to 4), t (40) = 3.47, p = 0.001.  
A Pearson’s correlation revealed a significant positive correlation between hunger and food-
related intrusive thought frequency, Pearson’s r = 0.56, p = 0.001. As the level of reported 
hunger increased so the number of food-related intrusive thoughts increased. 
Frequency of food-related intrusive thoughts was positively correlated with priming on the 
lexical decision task, Pearson’s r = 0.42, p = 0.006. As the frequency of intrusive thoughts 
increased, so the difference in lexical decision speed to neutral and food words increased. 
Frequency of food-related intrusive thoughts showed no correlation with lexical decision 
speed to either neutral (Pearson’s r = 0.26, p = 0.095) or food words (Pearson’s r = -0.098, p 
= 0.54). 
The correlation between priming on the lexical decision task and intrusive thoughts was 
reduced when hunger was controlled for (Pearson’s r = 0.25, p = 0.06), but remained in the 
same direction. 
Post-hoc analyses: semantic priming 
Hungry participants showed greater priming on the lexical decision task than satiated 
participants. This could be a result of cognitions associated with craving, as hypothesised. 
Alternatively, this could be a result of semantic priming of the food words developing during 
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the task. While the neutral words also formed a semantic category, being transport related, 
and so might have benefited from semantic priming; the context of the study might have lent 
greater salience to the food category. If this was happening, we would expect higher priming 
scores in the second half of the task, compared to the first. To test this, priming scores were 
calculated for the two halves of the task, for each participant (see figure 1). The mean priming 
scores in both halves were greater for hungry participants (1st half M = 158, SE = 40.33; 2nd 
half M = 182, SE = 23.91) than for satiated participants (1st half M = 65, SE = 33.86; 2nd half 
M = 96, SE = 36.82). 
[Insert figure 1 about here]  
A one-between (hungry vs. satiated) x one-within (first priming vs. second priming) ANOVA 
confirmed a main effect of hunger condition, F (1,40) = 7.93, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.075; 
confirming that the hungry participants demonstrated more priming than satiated participants, 
across both halves. All other results were non-significant (F<1). 
Discussion 
People who were hungry because they had missed breakfast took longer to respond to neutral 
words on the lexical decision task, than did satiated participants, who were tested after a 
morning of normal eating. The responses of hungry participants to food words, however, were 
as fast as those of the satiated participants. Speeded response times to food words relative to 
neutral words, i.e. priming, correlated strongly with self-reported hunger and with frequency 
of food-related intrusive thoughts experienced during the lexical decision. 
These results suggest that there are two events that are happening. Firstly, hungry participants 
demonstrate a slowing to neutral words. Previous research supports this slowing in cognitive 
performance with hunger (Benton, Slater & Donohoe, 2001; Green, Rogers, Elliman and 
Gatenby, 1994; Green & Rogers, 1995). Secondly, hungry participants were faster at 
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responding to the food-related words than the neutral words. Although the speed of response 
times to food-related items were similar for both conditions, hungry and satiated, the vital 
difference lies between the neutral and the food-related words in each case. This result 
suggests a sparing of food words from a general slowing in the hungry participants; compared 
to the satiated participants, hungry participants were faster at responding to food-related 
stimuli than neutral stimuli. This speeding in response times to food-related words relative to 
the neutral words in the hungry participants demonstrate an increased accessibility of food-
related items, relative to neutral. 
The correlation between intrusive thoughts and priming was weakened when hunger was 
controlled for. This result is not unexpected, as hunger correlates strongly with intrusive 
thoughts, and is consistent with the EI explanation of these results. The physiological cue of 
hunger is expected to increase the accessibility of target-related (food) information in 
memory, and in turn will increase the likelihood of an intrusive thought. 
Food-related words may have primed a food category in semantic memory, and therefore 
speeding to food words compared to neutral words could be due to greater semantic priming. 
Hungry people would be more susceptible to this because food items are more salient and 
preferentially attended (Mogg et al., 1998). However, although the priming scores increase 
slightly from the first half to the second half of the lexical decision task, this increase is not 
significant and does not differ across the groups. Hungry people showed greater priming even 
at the beginning of the lexical decision task. We conclude that the enhanced reaction times to 
food words, relative to neutral, for hungry participants reflects an increase in availability of 
food-related information in memory that is due to craving, rather than enhanced semantic 
priming from exposure to food words during the experiment. 
By demonstrating increased priming for food-related concepts with hunger, the present study 
is consistent with Aarts et al.’s (2001) finding of increased priming for drink-related 
information during thirst. Our finding is consistent with the idea of increased accessibility, 
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triggered by internal cognitions and external stimuli, as a precursor of desire and craving 
(Jarvik et al., 1995; Philips et al., 2004), not just of hunger. Kavanagh, Andrade and May 
(2005) argue that increased accessibility in craving forms a route to increased craving-related 
intrusions. The current study is consistent with this claim, demonstrating that intrusive 
thoughts about food increase in hunger, a state in which craving might occur, and are related 
to accessibility, as measured by the lexical decision task. 
It would be useful to replicate the correlation of accessibility and intrusive thoughts with 
thirst, in order to establish the reliability of the findings with another motivational state, in 
which craving may occur. Also, it would be interesting to extend this method to particular 
domains of craving, for example, craving for a particular food or more addictive cravings 
such as alcohol. Research currently being conducted by our group is attempting to replicate 
the present findings with participants who are reporting cravings for specific snack foods, 
rather than just hunger in general.  
The present study is also consistent with work on motivated behaviour more generally. 
Forster, Liberman and Higgins (2005) demonstrated that goals increase accessibility of 
related information in memory. In their first study, participants completed four blocks of two 
tasks; first, they looked through a set of pictures, then they completed a lexical decision task. 
Participants in the goal condition were instructed to find a picture of a pair of glasses when 
looking amongst the set. Before goal-fulfilment, the response times from the goal-condition 
had a greater advantage of goal-related constructs than in the no-goal condition. In the post-
fulfilment block (block three), this advantage was reversed to below the baseline level from 
the no-goal condition. Forster et al. (2005) replicated both of these findings using a Stroop 
task as well as showing that the observed increase in accessibility persists for as long as the 
goal remains unfulfilled. These results from Forster et al. (2005) are important because they 
support the idea that heightened accessibility of related constructs results from motivation, or 
a goal, which then helps detect stimuli in the environment to aid goal pursuit. 
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Possible limitations to this study must be considered when drawing conclusions from the 
results. Due to the nature of the design, participants in the two conditions were tested at 
differing times of day, before and after lunch. This may have had an adverse effect on the 
results of the study, as time of day may affect participants’ cognition, which could have 
implications for the lexical decision data. Even though this may be a confounding variable, it 
should be noted that participants’ testing times for both conditions were very close together. 
The present findings also have practical implications; priming on the lexical decision task 
may provide a useful alternative to previous measures of intrusive thoughts. Cognitive 
research has generally relied on subjective measures of intrusive thoughts, which can interfere 
with the very experience of the intrusive thought if reporting is done ‘on-line’. Giambra 
(1995) also pointed out that being aware of having to report an intrusive thought can prompt 
their occurrence, or reporting them can result in their termination. The use of retrospective 
self-report measures raises concerns about reliability, validity and demand characteristics on 
the data collected. Also, when intrusive thoughts are reported retrospectively, the apparent 
incidence of intrusions is subject to effects of manipulations on awareness and memory. For 
example, thought suppression techniques appear to make intrusions more frequent but they 
probably also make them more memorable, because intrusions that violate the goal of thought 
suppression are likely to be more salient than similar thoughts in a ‘think about anything’ 
control condition. Despite these limitations, the use of retrospective self-reports can 
sometimes be unavoidable. Measures provided by alternative correlates to intrusive thoughts, 
such as hunger questionnaires, may themselves prompt the occurrence of intrusive thoughts. 
The findings from this study may point toward an alternative to these measures. 
Giambra (1995) claimed that an ideal method of measuring intrusive thought experiences will 
be independent of the person’s awareness and not influence the production of the thoughts in 
any way; but such a method is unobtainable. However, such a method may be realised from 
this study. Priming measured by the lexical decision task provides a measure of proneness to 
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the occurrence of intrusive thoughts, and may therefore provide a useful and objective 
correlate of intrusive thoughts that could be used to test the effects on intrusion frequency of 
manipulations such as thought suppression independently of their effects on deliberate recall. 
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Appendix. Word lists used for the lexical decision task 
practice items buffer items 
Terminal Aeroplane 
Caravan Deck 
Gondola Clutch 
 Ticket 
 Pedal 
 
List A  List B 
neutral nonword  neutral nonword 
Bicycle Aocket  Aircraft Bew 
Brake Cailway  Cart Breal 
Buggy Corry  Coachman Buel 
Coach Gane  Gauge Cabour 
Crew Joachman  Jet Cricycle 
Dinghy Larf  Lorry Daste 
Ferry Lart  Lane Fack 
Fleet Oailor  Oar Flunch 
Fuel Railor  Railway Fuggy 
Glider Randwich  Rocket Glack 
Harbour Rar  Raft Hiscuits 
Kayak Rauge  Rails Kotor 
Motor Saxi  Sailor Mocolate 
Track Taft  Taxi Troach 
Truck Treese  Trailer Trook 
Wagon Whomach  Wharf Wuck 
food nonword  food nonword 
Biscuits Chood   Cheese Binghy  
Chocolate Cret   Crisps Chake  
Cook Dat   Dinner Cerry  
Hungry Eircraft   Eat Hayak  
Lunch Finner   Food Lagon  
Meal Seet  Sandwich Mungry  
Snack Stisps   Stomach Sneet 
Taste Swails   Sweet Tider  
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Table 1: Mean latencies (milliseconds) as a function of condition and word type 
 Condition 
 Hungry Satiated 
Word type Mean SD Mean SD 
Food-related 690 122 706 117 
Neutral 862 150 774 132 
Neutral – food 172 100 69 112 
22 
Figure 1: Mean priming scores (milliseconds) as a function of task half and condition 
(standard error bars) 
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